The Hospitals/Residents problem is a many-to-one extension of the stable marriage problem. In its instance, each hospital specifies a quota, i.e., an upper bound on the number of positions it provides. It is well-known that in any instance, there exists at least one stable matching, and finding one can be done in polynomial time. In this paper, we consider an extension in which each hospital specifies not only an upper bound but also a lower bound on its number of positions. In this setting, there can be instances that admit no stable matching, but the problem of asking if there is a stable matching is solvable in polynomial time. In case there is no stable matching, we consider the problem of finding a matching that is "as stable as possible", namely, a matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs. We show that this problem is hard to approximate within the ratio of (|H| + |R|) 1− for any positive constant where H and R are the sets of hospitals and residents, respectively. We tackle this hardness from two different angles. First, we give an exponential-time exact algorithm for a special case where all the upper bound quotas are one. This algorithm runs in time O(t 2 (|H|(|R|+t)) t+1 ) for instances whose optimal cost is t. Second, we consider another measure for optimization criteria, i.e., the number of residents who are involved in blocking pairs. We show that this problem is still NP-hard but has a polynomial-time |R|-approximation algorithm.
Introduction
In the stable marriage problem [10] , we are given sets of men and women, and each person's preference list that orders the members of the other sex according to his/her preference. The question is to find a stable matching, that is, a matching containing no pair of man and woman who prefer each other to their partners. Such a pair is called a blocking pair. Gale and Shapley proved that any instance admits at least one stable matching, and gave an algorithm to find one, known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. They also proposed a many-to-one extension of the stable marriage problem, which is currently known as the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR for short) [10] . In HR, the two sets corresponding to men and women are residents and hospitals. Each hospital specifies its quota, which means that it can accept at most this number of residents. Hence in a feasible matching, the number of residents assigned to each hospital is up to its quota. Most properties of the stable marriage problem carry over to HR, e.g., any instance admits a stable matching, and we can find one by the appropriately modified Gale-Shapley algorithm. As the name of HR suggests, it has real-world applications in assigning residents to hospitals in many countries, known as NRMP in the U.S. [12] , CaRMS in Canada [7] , and SFAS in Scotland [17] . Along with these applications and due to special requirements in reality, several useful extensions have been proposed, such as HR with couples [24, 23, 3, 22] , and the Student-Project Allocation problem [2] .
In this paper, we study another extension of HR where each hospital declares not only an upper bound but also a lower bound on the number of residents it accepts. Consequently, a feasible matching must satisfy the condition that the number of residents assigned to each hospital is between its upper and lower bound quotas. This restriction seems quite relevant in several situations. For example, shortage of doctors in hospitals in rural area is a critical issue; it is sometimes natural to guarantee some number of residents for such hospitals in the residents-hospitals matching. Also, when determining supervisors of students in universities, it is quite common to consider that the number of students assigned to each professor should be somehow balanced, which can be achieved again by specifying both upper and lower bounds on the number of students accepted by each professor. We call this problem HR with Minimum Quota (HRMQ for short).
The notion of minimum quota was first raised in [13] and followed by [5,16] (see "Related Work" below). In this paper, we are interested in a most natural question, i.e., how to obtain "good" matchings in this new setting. In HRMQ, stable matchings do not always exist. However, it is easy to decide whether or not there is a stable matching for a given instance, since in HR the number of students a specific hospital h receives is identical for any stable matching (this is a part of the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem [11] ). Namely, if this number satisfies the upper and lower bound conditions of all the hospitals, it is a feasible (and stable) matching, and otherwise, no stable matching exists. In case there is no stable matching, it is natural to seek for a matching "as stable as possible".
Our Contributions. We first consider the problem of minimizing the number of blocking pairs, which is quite popular in the literature (e.g., [20, 1, 6, 15] ). As shown in Sec. 2, it seems that the introduction of the quota lower bound intrinsically increases the difficulty of the problem. Actually, we show that this problem is NP-hard and cannot be approximated within a factor of (|H| + |R|) 1−ε for any positive constant ε unless P=NP, where H and R denote the sets of hospitals and residents, respectively. This inapproximability result holds even if all the preference lists are complete, all the hospitals have the same preference list, (e.g., determined by scores of exams and known as the master list [18]), and
